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the alter ego test. As a result, courts inconsistently asserted 
jurisdiction over multinational corporations, leading plaintiffs to 
forum shop and corporations to speculate which forums might assert 
jurisdiction over them. 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court in Daimler AG v. Bauman resolved 
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On January 14, 2014, in Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Supreme 
Court of the United States addressed whether a court may exercise 
general jurisdiction over a Non-U.S. corporation based on the contacts 
of its in-state subsidiary.1 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court 
held that “Daimler is not amenable to suit in California for injuries 
allegedly caused by conduct of [Mercedes Benz] Argentina that took 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See 134 S. Ct. 746, 748 (2014). 
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place entirely outside the United States.”2 This Comment will not only 
discuss the case’s facts, the ten-year procedural history, and the 
Supreme Court’s holding, but it will also discuss the case’s probable 
effects on suing multinational corporations and on the Nation’s 
economy and international affairs. Although the underlying legal basis 
for Daimler AG v. Bauman is the Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victim 
Protection Act, this Comment will not focus on plaintiffs’ allegations, 
but instead will solely concentrate on the jurisdictional issue.3 
This Comment will begin with a discussion of the legal background 
of the procedural issue in Daimler AG v. Bauman. In particular, Part I 
will explain general jurisdiction and the circuit split concerning the 
proper test for imputing a subsidiary’s contacts to its parent corporation 
for jurisdictional purposes. Part II will break down the Supreme Court’s 
opinion by discussing the case’s facts, its extensive procedural history, 
the rationale for the Court’s holding, and Justice Sotomayor’s 
concurrence. Part III will describe the likely effects of the Supreme 
Court’s holding, including the future of general jurisdiction, the correct 
test to apply for imputing contacts, the changes to the litigation 
environment, the impact on the United States economy, and the potential 
benefit to the Nation’s international affairs. Finally, Part IV will argue 
that the Supreme Court’s opinion was the proper one. 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
According to the Constitution of the United States, “[n]o state shall 
. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.”4 The Due Process Clause controls the ability of courts to assert 
jurisdiction over defendants.5 To ensure a court is not violating a 
person’s due process, it must properly exert in personam or personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.6 Since a judgment without personal 
jurisdiction violates due process, a judgment cannot bind a person unless 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
 5. See Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 
608 (1990) (“The proposition that the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is void 
traces back to the English Year Books…”); LINDA J. SILBERMAN, ALLAN R. STEIN & 
TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 64 (2d ed. 
2006). 
 6. SILBERMAN, STEIN & BARRINGTON WOLFF, supra note 5, at 72. 
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the court properly acquired power over that person.7 There are two ways 
to satisfy personal jurisdiction: specific jurisdiction (i.e. jurisdiction over 
claims that arose from or are related to the forum) and general 
jurisdiction (i.e. jurisdiction over all claims against a defendant).8 The 
debate in Daimler AG v. Bauman (“Daimler AG”) is whether California 
has the ability to assert general jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler 
Aktiengesellschaft’s (“Daimler”).9 
A. IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION: GENERAL JURISDICTION 
Courts exercise general jurisdiction when the defendant’s presence 
in the state is so strong that the courts of that state have power over the 
defendant without regard to where the claim arose.10 The textbook case11 
for general jurisdiction is Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,12 
where the Court relied on the defendant’s “continuous and systematic” 
contacts with the forum to justify its conclusion that asserting 
jurisdiction over the Non-U.S. company would not violate due process.13 
The Court clarified this standard by stating that a corporation’s contacts 
with the forum are continuous and systematic if they make the company 
essentially “at home” in the forum.14 Thus, for a corporation, general 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732 (1877). 
 8. SILBERMAN, STEIN & BARRINGTON WOLFF, supra note 5, at 89; see, e.g., Calder 
v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984) (exercising specific jurisdiction over the 
defendant when the forum is effected by the defendant’s activities even if the defendant 
did not enter the forum); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 
(1952) (allowing the exercise of general jurisdiction over the defendant because of its 
extensive activities within the forum). 
 9. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014). 
 10. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 
(1984) (“Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign 
corporation’s activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State’s 
subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient 
contacts between the State and the foreign corporation.”); see also SILBERMAN, STEIN & 
BARRINGTON WOLFF, supra note 5, at 89. 
 11. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856 
(2011). 
 12. 342 U.S. at 437. 
 13. See id. at 438 (acknowledging that Ohio was the corporation’s principal place 
of business even though it was only temporary). 
 14. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54; see, e.g., 
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2797-98 (2011) (holding that the 
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jurisdiction is typically based on (1) where a corporation is incorporated, 
and (2) where its principal place of business is located.15 
To determine whether exercising general jurisdiction satisfies due 
process and is reasonable, courts apply a two-part test.16 First, the court 
determines whether there are sufficient contacts between the defendant 
and the forum to permit personal jurisdiction.17 If there are sufficient 
contacts, then the court decides whether it would be reasonable for the 
court to exercise jurisdiction in the particular case.18 
                                                                                                                 
defendant was not subject to general jurisdiction because it was hardly “at home” in the 
forum). 
 15. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54 (noting that a 
company’s place of incorporation and its principal place of business are the two 
paradigm places where a corporation is regarded as “at home”). A company’s principal 
place of business is analogous to the nerve center of the business since it is typically 
where the corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s 
activities. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 89-90 (2010). 
 16. Even though the two-part analysis has only been applied in the special 
jurisdiction context and the Supreme Court has yet to decide “whether the 
reasonableness prong should apply in the general jurisdiction context,” Justice 
Sotomayor concluded that until the Supreme Court says otherwise, the two-prong test 
will be applied to questions about whether exercising general jurisdiction is appropriate. 
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 764-65 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 17. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985). 
 18. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476-77. Courts under the reasonableness 
prong usually consider whether exercising jurisdiction would offend traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice; the burden on the defendant to litigate in the forum; 
“the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff’s interest in 
obtaining convenient and effective relief; . . . the interstate judicial system’s interest in 
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the 
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); see also Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775-76 (1984) (holding that it would be fair to bring the 
claims in a court where “the State has a legitimate interest in holding respondent 
answerable on a claim” relating to its in-state activities); Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of 
Washington, Office of Unemployment Comp. and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) 
(“[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in 
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain 
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”). 
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B. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING HOW TO ATTRIBUTE A SUBSIDIARY’S 
CONTACTS TO ITS PARENT COMPANY 
A problem arises under the sufficient contacts prong when the 
defendant’s alleged contacts are actually its subsidiary’s contacts with 
the forum.19 In Cannon Manufacturing Company v. Cudahy Packing 
Company,20 the Supreme Court held “that jurisdiction over a parent 
company does not, standing alone, establish jurisdiction over a 
subsidiary company, and jurisdiction over the subsidiary is not 
equivalent to jurisdiction over a parent, unless the parent so controls and 
dominates the subsidiary to disregard the latter’s independent 
existence.”21 The Court based its decision on the fact that a subsidiary is 
a separate corporate entity from the parent corporation, and, as such, a 
parent company is not present in a forum merely by the presence of its 
wholly owned subsidiary.22 However, a lot has changed in the corporate 
environment during the past nine decades, blurring the line of what 
exactly constitutes a separate entity.23 As a result, the circuit courts have 
split over the proper test to apply when deciding whether a plaintiff can 
impute a subsidiary’s contacts to its parent company. 
1. The Alter Ego Test 
One way to demonstrate that a subsidiary’s contacts should be 
imputed to its parent corporation is through the alter ego test.24 Under 
this test, a parent corporation is the alter ego of its subsidiary when the 
parent company controls and directs all of the subsidiary’s activities, 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 925 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that when 
the defendant’s alleged contacts are those of its subsidiary, “the Court must engage in a 
preliminary inquiry to determine whether the subsidiaries contacts are properly 
attributed to the defendant”). 
 20. 267 U.S. 333 (1925). 
 21. SILBERMAN, STEIN & BARRINGTON WOLFF, supra note 5, at 91. Activities that 
will not disrupt the subsidiary’s independent existence include “monitoring of the 
subsidiary’s performance, supervision of the subsidiary’s finance and capital budget 
decisions, and articulation of general policies and procedures[.]” Doe, 248 F.3d at 926 
(quoting United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 72 (1998)). 
 22. See Cannon Mfg. Co., 267 U.S. at 335-37. 
 23. See generally Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Evolution of the Modern 
Corporation: Corporate Governance Reform in Context, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1001 
(2013). 
 24. See Jackson v. Tanfoglio Giuseppe, S.R.L., 615 F.3d 579, 586 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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and it is apparent that the creation of the subsidiary was for the sole 
purpose of limiting the parent’s liability.25 The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits employ the alter ego test to demonstrate 
that the parent corporation and its subsidiary are not separate entities.26 
In these circuits, “the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case (1) that 
there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the two entities no longer exist and (2) that failure to 
disregard their separate identities would result in fraud or injustice.”27 
2. The Limited Agency Test 
A second way to determine whether it is proper to attribute a 
subsidiary’s contacts to its parent company is through an agency test 
that resembles the standard set forth in the alter-ego test.28 The First and 
Eleventh Circuits employ a test that is essentially the alter ego test; 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See, e.g., Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GMBH & Co., 646 F.3d 
589 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding that the court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction since 
the parent’s lack of control and domination over the subsidiary showed that the two 
entities were not alter egos); Estate of Thomson v. Toyota Motor Corp. Worldwide, 545 
F.3d 357, 362-63 (6th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the parent and subsidiary are not alter 
egos because they have separate books, financial records, and bank accounts; file their 
own taxes; have separate boards of directors and workforces; and the subsidiary 
controls its distribution and manages its day-to-day operations); Cent. States, Se. and 
Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 945 (7th Cir. 
2000) (finding no personal jurisdiction over a parent company on the basis of its 
affiliation with a subsidiary who was a distinct corporate entity, and thus, not its alter 
ego); St. Jarre v. Heidelberger Druckmaschinen, No. 93-1848, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 
5604, at *7-8 (4th Cir. Mar. 25, 1994) (declining to exercise personal jurisdiction when 
the only evidence to portray an alter ego relationship was the existence of an invoice 
from the subsidiary that contains the same logo that appears on the parent corporation’s 
printing press in addition to two other logos); Dalton v. R&W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 
1359, 1363 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the parent corporation and its subsidiaries were 
not alter egos, even though the parent “own[ed] 100% of its subsidiaries, . . . remain[ed] 
responsible for general policy, . . . [had] subsidiaries funnel their revenues into 
centralized bank accounts and file a consolidated federal tax return, . . . [and] offer[ed] 
benefit plans to its subsidiaries’ employees”). 
 26. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 27. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations 
omitted). Alternatively, the first prong can be satisfied by showing that the subsidiary is 
the mere instrumentality of the parent corporation. See id. 
 28. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 
746 (2014) (No. 11-965), 2012 WL 379768; cf. supra note 27 and infra note 30. 
152 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XX 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
however, these circuits call it the agency test.29 This version of the 
agency test is similar to the approach for piercing the corporate veil 
since the court determines whether the affairs of the subsidiary and the 
parent corporation are “so intertwined as to demonstrate that the two 
corporations are, in reality, a single entity.”30 
3. The Agency Test 
A third approach to imputing a subsidiary’s contacts to its parent 
company is the agency test.31 The agency test utilizes two prongs, 
allowing for an expansive approach.32 First, the court must determine 
whether the parent corporation would perform the tasks of the subsidiary 
if the subsidiary did not exist (“sufficient importance” prong).33 Second, 
the court decides whether the parent corporation has the right to control 
the subsidiary (“control” prong).34 The Second and Ninth Circuits 
employ this test.35 Since Daimler AG was on appeal from the Ninth 
Circuit, this test is significant to the Supreme Court’s decision. 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See, e.g., Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1293-94 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (noting that the court will only exercise general personal jurisdiction if the 
plaintiff showed that the subsidiary’s “existence was simply a formality”); Miller v. 
Honda Motor Co., 779 F.2d 769, 772-73 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding nothing wrong with 
creating a subsidiary for limiting one’s liability as long as the two entities are “not so 
intertwined as to demonstrate . . . a single entity”). 
 30. Miller, 779 F.2d at 772-73 (referencing the corporate disregard doctrine); cf. 
Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569-70 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[A] 
corporate entity will be disregarded and the veil of limited liability pierced when . . . 
[there is] such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the 
corporation and the individual [or other corporation] no longer exist; and . . . adherence 
to the fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote 
injustice.”). 
 31. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 776 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 32. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 28, at 17. 
 33. Bauman, 676 F.3d at 776. The tasks would be performed by the parent itself or 
by entering an agreement with a different subsidiary or distributor. Id. 
 34. Id. at 776-77. 
 35. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 929 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that 
the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence to show that the parent would conduct and 
control the operations of its subsidiary if it were unavailable); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding general jurisdiction appropriate 
because the defendant’s relationship with its subsidiary went beyond mere solicitation, 
and it was obvious to the court that the parent would perform equivalent services if the 
subsidiary did not exist). 
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II. BREAKDOWN OF DAIMLER AG V. BAUMAN 
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
From 1976 through 1983, there was a period of terrorism in 
Argentina known as the “Dirty War.”36 During this period, Argentina’s 
military and security forces battled the guerilla organizations by 
torturing, kidnapping, and killing political dissidents.37 Throughout this 
period, Mercedes Benz Argentina operated a plant in Gonzales Catan, 
Argentina.38 
Plaintiffs, respondents in the Supreme Court case, are twenty-three 
people who were either Mercedes Benz Argentina’s employees or 
relatives of an employee during the “Dirty War.”39 They assert claims 
under the Alien Tort Statute, the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 
and the laws of California and Argentina by alleging that Mercedes 
Benz Argentina collaborated with the Argentine government to commit 
human rights violations during the “Dirty War.”40 
Plaintiffs claim that Mercedes Benz Argentina allowed the military 
and police officers stationed inside the plant to raid the plant to 
determine which employees were “subversive.”41 The government 
characterized each Plaintiff as a “subversive.”42 Due to this status, the 
government kidnapped and tortured, murdered, or exiled Plaintiffs.43 
According to the complaint, Mercedes Benz Argentina harmed these 
“subversives” in order to reverse the plant’s production slowdown.44 At 
the time of these events, Mercedes Benz Argentina was a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Daimler’s predecessor in interest.45 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 752 (2014); ANTONIUS C. G. M. 
ROBBEN, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TRAUMA IN ARGENTINA 171 (2005). 
 37. ROBBEN, supra note 36, at 164-65. 
 38. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 752. 
 39. Id. at 750-51; Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2005 
WL 3157472, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005). 
 40. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 751; see also First Amended Complaint at 17, 
Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005), 
ECF No. 11. 
 41. First Amended Complaint, supra note 40, at 10. 
 42. Id. at 11. 
 43. Id. at 11-14. 
 44. Id. at 15. 
 45. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 752. 
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In 1998, Chrysler Corporation and Daimler-Benz AG became 
subsidiaries wholly owned by Daimler.46 After this corporate change, 
Chrysler Corporation renamed itself DaimlerChrysler Corporation, but 
kept its principal place of business in Michigan.47 In addition, Daimler 
continued to be a German corporation with its headquarters in Stuttgart, 
Germany.48 Daimler “manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in 
Germany,” and “does not import, manufacture, sell, service, or warranty 
cars in California.”49 Instead, Mercedes-Benz United States 
(“MBUSA”), a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in New 
Jersey and multiple facilities in California, purchases vehicles from 
Daimler and then imports and distributes them throughout the United 
States.50 Daimler lays out its relationship with MBUSA in a General 
Distributor Agreement, which establishes MBUSA as an independent 
contractor.51 
Plaintiffs bring their claims against Daimler, asserting that it should 
be vicariously liable for Mercedes Benz Argentina’s actions since they 
were “committed in furtherance of [Mercedes Benz Argentina]’s 
business interests and activities and with the advance knowledge, 
acquiescence and subsequent ratification of” Daimler’s predecessor in 
interest.52 Likewise, Plaintiffs believe that Daimler is vicariously liable 
for the actions of Mercedes Benz Argentina’s employees.53 Furthermore, 
Plaintiffs assert that Argentina is an inadequate forum because the courts 
are comprised of corrupt judges, the police and military forces are likely 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 750; Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-
00194 RMW, 2005 WL 3157472, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005). 
 47. Bauman, 2005 WL 3157472, at *1. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 752; Bauman, 2005 WL 3157472, at *1. In addition 
to importation and distribution, MBUSA advertises, services, and sells cars in the 
United States. Bauman, 2005 WL 3157472, at *1. “According to the record . . . , 
MBUSA is the largest supplier of luxury vehicles to the California market. In particular, 
over 10% of all sales of new vehicles in the United States take place in California, and 
MBUSA’s California sales account for 2.4% of Daimler’s worldwide sales.” Daimler 
AG, 134 S. Ct. at 752. 
 51. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 752. MBUSA “has no authority to make binding 
obligations for or act on behalf of [Daimler] or any DaimlerChrysler Group Company.” 
Id. 
 52. Complaint at 15, Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005), ECF No. 1. 
 53. Id. 
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to retaliate, civil cases take years to resolve, and the available remedy is 
inadequate.54 
In 2004, Plaintiffs first served their complaint upon Daimler in 
Germany; however, the German appellate court issued a stay order, 
which held that service would violate sovereignty rights and prohibited 
their complaint.55 Because of this, Plaintiffs attempted to serve Daimler 
in Michigan at DaimlerChrysler Corporation’s headquarters, but once 
again were unable to serve their complaint.56 
Subsequently, Daimler “filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency 
of service, and to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.”57 Only the 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was pending before 
the Court.58 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiffs’ suit against Daimler was in the court system for 
approximately ten years before the Supreme Court of the United States 
made its decision.59 The United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California rendered the first decision in 2005.60 The issue 
before the District Court was whether “a federal court [could] exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a case arising under federal subject matter 
jurisdiction in which plaintiffs are all foreign nationals and the 
defendant is a foreign corporation which has subsidiaries doing business 
in the United States.”61 After reviewing the parties’ papers and 
conducting a hearing, the District Court tentatively granted Daimler’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but before finalizing 
its decision, it allowed Plaintiffs limited jurisdictional discovery.62 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. 
 55. Bauman, 2005 WL 3157472, at *1. 
 56. Id. at *2. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. Daimler withdrew its motion for insufficient service after plaintiffs’ 
opposition, but it continued to assert that personal jurisdiction was improper since 
plaintiffs will be unable to establish general jurisdiction and they do not seek to 
establish specific jurisdiction. See id. 
 59. Plaintiffs filed their first complaint on January 13, 2004, and the Supreme 
Court issued its decision on January 14, 2014. 
 60. Bauman, 2005 WL 3157472. 
 61. Id. at *3. 
 62. Id. at *1, 19 (granting limited discovery on “whether an agency relationship 
exists between [Daimler] and MBUSA and the ability of plaintiffs to pursue their 
claims in Germany . . . or Argentina” before making its final decision). 
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Although the court did not make a final decision, it concluded that 
Plaintiffs failed to establish that Daimler had continuous and systematic 
contacts with California, and that more factors weighed in favor of 
finding the assertion of jurisdiction unreasonable.63 
Upon the conclusion of the limited discovery, the District Court 
affirmed its tentative ruling and granted Daimler’s motion to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction.64 From discovery, the court found that 
MBUSA is not Daimler’s agent since there was evidence to show that 
Daimler had used alternative automobile distribution channels in the 
past, illustrating that Daimler could use them if MBUSA did not exist.65 
In addition, Argentina and Germany are both adequate alternative 
forums.66 Accordingly, the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims. 
Plaintiffs appealed this decision, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal.67 Upon reviewing the case de novo, the court found that 
“[b]ecause there [was] insufficient control and because MBUSA does 
not serve as [Daimler]’s representative, the contacts of MBUSA cannot 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. at *4-19. In regards to whether Daimler has systematic and continuous 
contacts with California, the court found that Daimler provided enough evidence to 
show that its alleged contacts with California are only attributable to Daimler’s 
subsidiaries, and, as such, they are not direct contacts of Daimler. Id. at *6-7. In 
addition, the court noted that “designing a product specifically for the forum market . . . 
[is] helpful for establishing purposeful availment . . . [h]owever, purposeful availment 
alone is not enough to establish general jurisdiction.” Id. at *8. Moreover, the court 
applied the agency test and determined that MBUSA’s activities should not be imputed 
to Daimler. Id. at *11-12. In regards to whether the assertion of general jurisdiction was 
reasonable, the court concluded that Daimler’s personal interjection and Plaintiff’s 
ability to obtain convenient and effective relief favored jurisdiction, whereas the burden 
on Daimler of litigating in California, the potential conflicts with the sovereignty of 
Argentina and Germany, and California’s interest in adjudicating the dispute weighed 
against exercising jurisdiction. Id. at *13-19. Additionally, the court felt that it was 
difficult to balance whether another forum would be an adequate alternative in 
providing an efficient judicial resolution of the dispute. Id. at *18-19. 
 64. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13116, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007). 
 65. See id. at *8-9. 
 66. Id. at *18. Argentina is an adequate alternative because some of the Plaintiffs 
in this case are already pressing criminal charges in Argentina, and there is a similar 
lawsuit pending in Argentina against Ford. Id. at *10-11. Germany is also an adequate 
alternative since the claims may not be time-barred and “the German legal system is 
designed to vigorously safeguard basic individual and human rights.” Id. at *12-18. 
 67. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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be imputed.”68 Therefore, Daimler does not have continuous and 
systematic contacts, and the court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction 
over Daimler.69 
Unhappy with the decision, Plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing, 
which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted.70 A three-judge panel 
reheard the case and subsequently reversed the district court’s decision, 
denying Daimler’s motion to dismiss.71 During the rehearing, the court 
concluded that the agency test was in fact satisfied and that exercising 
jurisdiction over Daimler would be reasonable.72 In regards to holding 
that MBUSA was Daimler’s agent, the court found that MBUSA’s 
services are so sufficiently important to Daimler that if MBUSA did not 
exist, Daimler would have to conduct the services itself or replace 
MBUSA with another distributor.73 Additionally, the court determined 
that the General Distributor Agreement illustrated a clear intent that 
Daimler “has the right to control nearly all aspects of MBUSA’s 
operations.”74 Regarding reasonableness, the court concluded that 
“exercising personal jurisdiction over [Daimler] comports with fair play 
and substantial justice” since Daimler “has purposefully and extensively 
interjected itself into the California market through MBUSA.”75 
Moreover, California, as a part of the United States, has “a strong 
interest in adjudicating and redressing international human rights 
abuses.”76 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. at 1096-97. 
 69. See id. at 1097. 
 70. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 603 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2010). Upon 
granting the rehearing, the court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s prior opinion. See id. 
 71. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 72. See id. at 921-30. 
 73. See id. at 921-22. 
 74. Id. at 923-24. For example, MBUSA must comply with all current and future 
requirements set forth by Daimler, and must notify Daimler of all of its actions, 
“including personnel changes, customer information, and marketing strategy.” Id.          
at 924. 
 75. Id. at 925, 929-30. The court found that factors one (the extent of purposeful 
interjection) and four (the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the suit) outweighed the 
other five factors. See id. at 924-30 (concluding that the evidence showed only a slight 
burden on the parties to litigate in another country, Daimler has a strong presence in the 
United States market, the United States may not have a more efficient judicial 
resolution than Germany, there is a conflict of whether a claim could be brought in 
Germany, and there is a substantial doubt that Argentina is an adequate alternative 
forum). 
 76. Id. at 927. 
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Opposing the Ninth Circuit’s decision, a circuit judge petitioned for 
a rehearing en banc.77 The vote resulted in a majority of the active 
judges declining to rehear the case.78 Upon failing to obtain a rehearing 
en banc, Daimler petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court 
of the United States.79 The writ was granted to determine “whether it 
violates due process for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction 
over a foreign corporation based solely on the fact that an indirect 
corporate subsidiary performs services on behalf of the defendant in the 
forum State.”80 
C. SUPREME COURT’S HOLDING 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision and held that California cannot assert general jurisdiction over 
Daimler.81 
The Court begins its analysis with a discussion of the appropriate 
test for determining whether a plaintiff can impute an in-state 
subsidiary’s contacts to its parent company, making the parent company 
subject to general jurisdiction.82 In addition, the Court recognizes that 
there is a circuit split on whether to apply the alter ego test or the agency 
test to attribute contacts of a subsidiary to its parent corporation, and 
explains that it is difficult to pin down exactly when a subsidiary is and 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 774 (9th Cir. 2011). 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35(f), a judge can call for a vote to determine 
whether the case will be reheard en banc. FED. R. APP. P. 35(f). “A majority of the 
circuit judges who are in regular active service . . . may order that an appeal . . . be 
heard or reheard by the court of appeals en banc. An en banc hearing or rehearing is not 
favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en banc consideration is necessary 
to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves 
a question of exceptional importance.” FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). 
 78. See Bauman, 676 F.3d at 774. Of all the active judges, only eight judges voted 
for the rehearing. See id. 
 79. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 28. 
 80. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct 1995, 2013 WL 1704716 (2013); 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 28, at i. 
 81. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct 746, 748 (2014) (holding that “Daimler 
is not amenable to suit in California for injuries allegedly caused by conduct of MB 
Argentina that took place entirely outside the United States”). 
 82. See id. at 758-60. This is a case of first impression. See id. at 759 (stating that 
the court has yet to address this question). 
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is not an agent.83 Ultimately, the Court concluded that it could not 
uphold the Ninth Circuit’s analysis because it would always lead to a 
court having general jurisdiction over a Non-U.S. parent corporation 
based on its in-state subsidiary.84 
Next, the Court evaluated Daimler’s contacts with California to 
determine whether it is “at home” within the forum.85 Even though the 
Court assumes that MBUSA is “at home” in California, the Court holds 
that Daimler is not “at home” there.86 The Court emphasizes that 
corporations are amenable to suit based on their affiliations in easily 
ascertainable places, such as its place of incorporation and its principal 
place of business.87 Although these two places are paradigm, they are 
not inclusive.88 Applying Plaintiffs’ argument that jurisdiction should be 
exercised in every forum where a “corporation engages in a substantial, 
continuous, and systematic course of business” would lead to 
“unacceptably grasping” results.89 Instead, the Court explains that 
general jurisdiction relies on a corporation’s activities that are 
continuous and “are so substantial and of such a nature as to justify 
suit.”90 Using this rationale, the Court found that California is neither the 
place of incorporation nor the principal place of business for either 
Daimler or MBUSA.91 Additionally, Daimler’s operations in California 
do not rise to the level that would render it “at home” in the forum.92 
Because of the foregoing, the Court found that the Ninth Circuit erred in 
its decision to hold Daimler susceptible to suit in California for activities 
that did not involve or impact the forum.93 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See id. at 759 (noting that “the fact that one may be an agent for one purpose 
does not make him or her an agent for every purpose”). 
 84. See id. at 759-60 (explaining that “anything a corporation does through an 
independent contractor, subsidiary, or distributor is presumably something that the 
corporation would do ‘by other means’ if the independent contractor, subsidiary, or 
distributor did not exist”). 
 85. See id. at 760-62. 
 86. See id. at 758, 760. 
 87. See id. at 760. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 760-61. 
 90. Id. at 761 (recognizing that “the inquiry under Goodyear . . . is whether that 
corporation’s affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render it 
essentially at home in the forum State”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. at 758, 761 n.19. 
 93. See id. at 758, 762. 
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D. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’S CONCURRENCE 
Justice Sotomayor concurred only in the Court’s judgment (i.e. 
California could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Daimler) since 
she believed that the Court was wrong both procedurally and 
substantively.94 Instead of following the Court’s rationale, Justice 
Sotomayor explains that the same outcome would result if the Court 
based its decision only on the reasonableness inquiry.95 To her, it is clear 
that it would be unreasonable for California to assert jurisdiction over 
Daimler in this case.96 
Justice Sotomayor makes several critiques of the majority’s 
rationale.97 Her main criticism is that the majority failed to apply the 
Court’s established precedent correctly since it did not focus solely on 
the extent of Daimler’s in-state contacts.98 If it had, the Court would 
have concluded that Daimler had sufficient contacts in California to 
render it “at home.”99 In addition, Justice Sotomayor believes that the 
current rule (i.e. continuous and substantial contacts) is more predictable 
than the Court’s new approach with the proportionality inquiry.100 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See id. at 763-64 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Regarding procedure, Justice 
Sotomayor notes that the majority’s holding is based on a proposition “that was neither 
argued nor passed on below . . . .” Id. at 764. Whereas, the substantive issue relates to 
how the majority ignored the fact that personal jurisdiction may be asserted when a 
“defendant has sufficiently taken advantage of the State’s laws and protections through 
its contacts in the State[.]” Id. 
 95. See id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (concluding that the “exercise of 
jurisdiction would be unreasonable given that the case involves foreign plaintiffs suing 
a foreign defendant based on foreign conduct, and given that a more appropriate forum 
is available”). 
 96. See id. at 765 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (comparing the case at bar with 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102 
(1987), and recognizing that in both cases, there was insufficient evidence to prove that 
litigating in California would be more convenient than in Germany). 
 97. See id. at 767-73 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 98. See id. at 767-69 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). In Justice Sotomayor’s opinion, 
the majority based its decision on Daimler’s in-state contacts in comparison to its out-
of-state contacts. See id. at 767. The majority rebuts this by stating that “[g]eneral 
jurisdiction . . . calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, 
nationwide and worldwide” and that the test is not synonymous with “doing business.” 
Id. at 762 n.20. 
 99. See id. at 769 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 100. Id. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that in actuality, the majority’s 
approach adds an additional layer of uncertainty). In addition, the new approach will 
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Furthermore, she explains that the majority’s approach will create 
injustice by preventing courts from having the ability to assert 
jurisdiction over corporations “who have engaged in continuous and 
substantial business operations within their boundaries.”101 Similarly, 
this new standard will treat small businesses unfairly in comparison with 
national and multinational companies, it will allow a court to assert 
jurisdiction over an individual defendant if served when visiting the 
forum, and it will shift the risk of loss to the harmed individuals.102 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
Since the Supreme Court of the United States has not previously 
addressed whether a subsidiary’s contacts can be attributed to its parent 
company for the basis of general jurisdiction, there are bound to be 
implications for future lawsuits.103 Ninth Circuit Judge O’Scannlain 
believes that the outcome of this case could result in “a gratuitous threat 
to our nation’s economy, international relations, and international 
comity.”104 In order to minimize the potential dangers anticipated by 
Judge O’Scannlain, the Supreme Court has decided that in situations 
similar to the one at hand, fairness to defendants outweighs justice for 
plaintiffs.105 Moreover, the well-established principles of protecting the 
corporate veil probably influenced the Supreme Court’s decision.106 
This Part will address five expected effects of the Daimler AG 
holding. First, it will discuss the future of general jurisdiction. Second, it 
will argue that the agency test does not survive Daimler AG, and 
therefore, plaintiffs cannot use the agency test to impute an in-state 
subsidiary’s contacts to its parent corporation. Third, it will explain how 
the Supreme Court’s decision will alter the litigation environment. 
                                                                                                                 
lead to greater unpredictability since it radically expands the scope of jurisdictional 
discovery because courts will have to compare a company’s in-state contacts with all of 
its contacts. See id. at 770-71. 
 101. Id. at 772-73 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 102. See id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 103. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 104. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 105. Lauren Carasik, Supreme Court Ruling Shields Corporations from 
Accountability, AL JAZEERA AMERICA, Feb. 20, 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/ 
opinions/2014/2/supreme-court-daimlerbaumanhumanrightsargentina.html (arguing that 
the Supreme Court’s decision promotes corporate interests, limits redress for corporate 
misconduct, and fails to advance justice for human rights victims). 
 106. Cf. Bauman, 676 F.3d at 777 (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s holding rejects 
corporate separateness). 
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Fourth, it will emphasize the holding’s positive impact on the Nation’s 
economy and the likely economic consequences if the Supreme Court 
held otherwise. Finally, it will comment on how the Supreme Court’s 
decision will benefit the country’s international affairs. 
A. DAIMLER AG DOES NOT CHANGE EXISTING FEDERAL LAW REGARDING 
GENERAL JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court in Daimler AG essentially affirmed its decision 
in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.107 Throughout its 
opinion, the Court relied heavily on its previous 2011 opinion and 
emphasized how precedent in the realm of general jurisdiction is 
controlling.108 The Court’s reliance on Goodyear’s “at home” standard 
and the Court’s application of the paradigm forums stated in the 
Goodyear opinion indicates its reluctance to stray from precedent.109 
However, even though the Supreme Court followed the same reasoning 
as its prior decisions, this affirmation can potentially create a new split 
among the circuits concerning what deems a corporation “at home” in a 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); see 
also infra notes 109-110 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 757-58 (2014) (declining “to 
stretch general jurisdiction beyond limits traditionally recognized”); see also Burton N. 
Lipshie, Daimler AG v. Bauman: Supreme Court Rewrites the Law of Presence 
Jurisdiction, STROOCK SPECIAL BULLETIN, at 2 (Jan. 21, 2014), 
http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub1435.pdf (recognizing that the Supreme Court 
relied and expanded upon its previous 2011 opinion). The expansion can be seen 
through the clarification of the “at home” standard. See Robert A. Matthews, Jr., 
Annotation, Test for Determining General Personal Jurisdiction, 5 Annotated Patent 
Digest § 36:100 (2014) (quoting Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20) (pointing out that 
the determination “requires ‘an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, 
nationwide’ and ‘does not focu[s] solely on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state 
contacts’”). 
 109. See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (using the locations of Daimler’s principal 
place of business and place of incorporation as the appropriate forums for exercising 
jurisdiction to conclude that its “slim contacts with [California] hardly render it at home 
there”). In addition, the Court referenced Goodyear throughout its analysis of 
determining whether the Court should exercise general jurisdiction over Daimler and 
refused to sway from Goodyear’s logic. See id. at 760-62 (explaining that going beyond 
the reasoning of Goodyear is “unacceptably grasping”). By affirming its previous 
decision, “the Court unambiguously articulated the standard for general jurisdiction.” 
Daniel B. Goldman & Adam W. Braveman, Eroding Theory of General Personal 
Jurisdiction: Effect of ‘Bauman’, N.Y. L.J. 1, 2 (Feb. 3, 2014). 
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forum where the corporation is not incorporated and where it does not 
operate its principal place of business.110 
B. THE AGENCY TEST FOR IMPUTING CONTACTS DOES NOT SURVIVE 
DAIMLER AG 
By following precedent and complying with the well-established 
piercing the corporate veil doctrine, the Court finally resolved a long-
standing circuit split in favor of due process and the test applied by a 
majority of the circuits.111 It is clear from the Supreme Court’s opinion 
that the agency test is improper for imputing a subsidiary’s contacts to 
its parent company.112 The Court’s rationale for this holding seemed to 
be fairness and foreseeability.113 Regarding fairness, the Court 
emphasized how the agency test would always result in finding 
jurisdiction; hence, it is too broad.114 In regards to foreseeability, the 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See Vivek Krishnamurthy, United States: Daimler AG v. Bauman: In Latest 
ATS Decision, The Supreme Court Limits Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts Over 
Multinational Corporations, FOLEY HOAG LLP (Jan. 22, 2014), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/287768/Corporate+Governance/Daimler+AG+
v+Bauman+In+Latest+ATS+Decision+The+Supreme+Court+Limits+Jurisdiction+Of+
US+Courts+Over+Multinational+Corporations (noting that a circuit court could 
interpret the new standard in a way that would lead a corporation to have homes in 
many forums). 
 111. See Bauman, 676 F.3d at 777-78 (stating that it violates due process to impute a 
subsidiary’s contacts to its parent company when the two are separate entities, and 
recognizing that the Ninth Circuit’s holding “would be improper in many other 
circuits”); accord. discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 112. See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 758-60. The Court stated that “in no event can 
the appeals court’s analysis be sustained.” Id. at 759. 
 113. See generally id. at 759-62. 
 114. See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 759 (noting that the agency test “will always 
yield a pro-jurisdiction answer”); see also Goldman & Braveman, supra note 109, at 2. 
The Court further explains that the test “appears to subject foreign corporations to 
general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome 
that would sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’ we rejected 
in Goodyear.” Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 759-60; see also Donald Earl Childress III, 
General Jurisdiction and the Transnational Law Market, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 
67, 79 (2013) [hereinafter General Jurisdiction and the Transnational Law Market] 
(finding the agency test broad since it would subject every Non-U.S. company to a 
forum’s jurisdiction based on the presence of its subsidiary). In addition, “fairness 
requires U.S. courts to exercise restraint in cases such as this” in order to prevent 
domestic corporations from being held liable wherever their Non-U.S. subsidiaries are 
conducting business. General Jurisdiction and the Transnational Law Market at 79. 
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agency test is unpredictable.115 Under the agency test, corporations are 
unable to predict which forums could hold them liable, especially 
because a lawsuit could be based on a subsidiary’s contacts that the 
parent corporation did not know existed.116 Furthermore, the Court 
described the agency test as unacceptably grasping.117 Thus, the agency 
test is improper to use for attributing contacts to a parent corporation. 
C. DAIMLER AG CHANGES THE LITIGATION ENVIRONMENT, IN 
PARTICULAR THE ABILITY TO SUE A NON-U.S. PARENT COMPANY IN A 
UNITED STATES’ FORUM 
Since Daimler AG provides a clear, narrow rule that denotes where 
a Non-U.S. corporation is subject to liability, plaintiffs will have a 
harder time justifying a lawsuit against a Non-U.S. corporation.118 In 
particular, the Court’s holding will substantially affect courts that follow 
the agency test, especially those that comprise the Second and Ninth 
Circuits.119 For instance, plaintiffs will only be able to sue a Non-U.S. 
corporation if they can prove that the subsidiary and the parent company 
are not separate entities.120 Because the Court’s holding makes the 
                                                                                                                 
 115. See Bauman, 676 F.3d at 775 (stating that the agency test gives the parent 
corporation “no minimum assurance as to where . . . conduct will and will not render 
[it] liable to suit”) (internal citations omitted). 
 116. See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 761-62 (explaining that exorbitant exercises of 
jurisdiction would lead to a parent corporation’s inability to structure its business “with 
some minimum assurance as to where” it could be brought into court). 
 117. See supra notes 89, 109 and accompanying text. 
 118. See Dwight Healy & Owen Pell, Daimler AG v. Bauman: The US Supreme 
Court Significantly Limits Where Companies May Be Sued for Claims Unrelated to 
Their Activities in a State, WHITE & CASE LLP, at 1 (Jan. 27, 2014), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/daimler-ag-v-bauman-the-us-supreme-cou-19242 
(“Daimler [] is likely to focus attention on how personal jurisdiction is pled and how 
difficult courts will make it for plaintiffs to try to plead around corporate separateness 
to establish personal jurisdiction over non-resident companies with affiliated companies 
in a forum.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Goldman & Braveman, supra note 109, at 3 (Feb. 3, 2014) 
(discussing how “Bauman significantly changes the landscape of personal jurisdiction 
in New York,” and noting that general jurisdiction over a corporation in forums where 
it is not incorporated and does not operate its principal place of business will only be 
appropriate in exceptional cases). 
 120. See Dennis P. Ziemba & Heather R. Fine, Personal Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Defendants: Issues to Consider, 78 PA. B. ASS’N. Q. 167, 170 (2007) (noting that 
separate entities exist when both the parent corporation and the subsidiary “maintain[] 
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burden of proving general jurisdiction over a multinational corporation 
more difficult, the number of American lawsuits against Non-U.S. 
corporations will be limited. 
Additionally, Daimler AG’s holding will probably affect the way 
plaintiffs forum-shop.121 Typically, plaintiffs look to sue in the forum 
that will be most favorable both substantively and procedurally.122 
Naturally, the United States is an advantageous choice for filing a 
lawsuit for many reasons, including the United States’ generous 
substantive laws, its liberal discovery rules, and the potential to be 
awarded punitive damages and attorney’s fees.123 Not only do these 
characteristics assist in obtaining a favorable verdict, but they also 
provide the plaintiff with “significant leverage to force defendants to 
settle.”124 Nevertheless, the Daimler AG holding curtails a plaintiff’s 
ability to sue a Non-U.S. corporation in the Second or Ninth Circuits for 
actions taking place outside the forum since a plaintiff can no longer 
utilize the expansive agency test to justify exercising general 
jurisdiction.125 Instead, all circuits will follow the same constitutionally 
based jurisdictional standard.126 
                                                                                                                 
its own corporate books and financial records, [hold] its own bank accounts and file[] 
its own tax returns”). 
 121. Forum-shopping is “[t]he practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction 
or court in which a claim might be heard.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (9th ed. 
2009). 
 122. See General Jurisdiction and the Transnational Law Market, supra note 114,  
at 68. 
 123. See General Jurisdiction and the Transnational Law Market, supra note 114,  
at 73. American courts attract numerous claims by Non-U.S. citizens because of its 
favorable policies toward plaintiffs, including a more liberal granting of damages, the 
availability of aggregation devices, a right to jury trial, and an allowance for 
contingency fees. See MARCUS, SHERMAN & ERICHSON, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES 
& MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 130-31 (5th ed. 2010). The fact that 
“the U.S. has been a major producer nation in the global economy” allows access to 
these benefits regardless of citizenship because of a company’s significant ties to the 
United States. See id. at 131. However, corporations try to dismiss a Non-U.S. citizen’s 
lawsuit with the doctrine of forum non conveniens claiming that the country where the 
harm occurred has the primary interest in resolving the suit. See id. 
 124. General Jurisdiction and the Transnational Law Market, supra note 114, at 73; 
see also MARCUS, SHERMAN & ERICHSON, supra note 123, at 130. 
 125. See discussion supra Part II.C; see also U.S. Supreme Court Severely 
Circumscribes “Presence” as Basis for Personal Jurisdiction of Foreign Corporations 
Claim Itself Must Have Local Roots; If It Hasn’t, Corporation’s Overall Contacts with 
State Won’t Support Jurisdiction, 265 SIEGEL’S PRAC. REV. 1 (Jan. 2014) (recognizing 
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D. DAIMLER AG WILL POSITIVELY AFFECT THE NATION’S ECONOMY 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler AG will have a positive 
effect on the Nation’s economy. Companies prefer to invest and do 
business in places where they can predict the jurisdictional 
consequences of their actions.127 When jurisdictional consequences are 
unpredictable, there is a disincentive to invest or do business in a forum 
because a corporation could be liable in that forum for any of its actions 
anywhere worldwide; thus, increasing costs.128 However, when a 
corporation can predict which forums have the capability of holding it 
liable, it has the ability to buy insurance, the opportunity to incorporate 
the costs of potential litigation into its products’ prices, and the chance 
to decide whether to operate in a state whose costs outweigh its 
benefits.129 Since “corporations have become accustomed to working 
under the alter ego doctrine,” the Court’s holding will increase 
predictability by aligning a court’s jurisdictional reach with a 
corporation’s established business practices for making investment 
decisions.130 Because the type of “litigation environment critically 
                                                                                                                 
that plaintiffs will no longer be able to “enthusiastically exploit[]” the vast jurisdiction 
opportunities, but noting that it is still possible to sue a Non-U.S. corporation). 
 126. See discussion supra Part III.B; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra 
note 28, at 19. 
 127. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965), 2013 WL 3377321 
(stating that the inability to make accurate jurisdictional predictions is a disincentive to 
conducting a particular activity); Brief of Economiesuisse, the Swiss Bankers Ass’n, 
ICC Switzerland, Ass’n of German Banks, and the European Banking Federation as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 12, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 
(2014) (No. 11-965), 2013 WL 3421893 (recognizing that “[p]redictable legal rules . . . 
provide a climate conducive to foreign investment”). 
 128. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra 
note 127, at 2 (stating that “the price of admission [to a forum] is consenting to answer 
in that forum for all of its conduct worldwide,” and therefore unpredictability 
discourages a company from setting up distribution channels). 
 129. See Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En 
Banc at 15-17, Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 676 F.3d 774 (2011) (No. 07-15386), 
2011 WL 2784327. Companies want the ability to foresee which forum they could be 
held liable in, so they can minimize the risk of litigation as much as possible. Id. at 16. 
 130. See Todd W. Noelle, At Home in the Outer Limits: DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman 
and the Bounds of General Personal Jurisdiction, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
SIDEBAR 17, 33 (2013) (explaining that the easier a corporate business decision is, the 
more likely commerce will be facilitated). 
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influences a foreign company’s decision to invest in the United States,” 
it is clear that lower anticipated costs will lead to more capital 
investment.131 
Moreover, corporate defendants favor places with a narrow general 
jurisdiction doctrine.132 This is to be expected because corporations 
create subsidiaries to limit their liability and to ensure that they will not 
be sued in a forum where they cannot satisfy the minimum jurisdiction 
requirements.133 U.S. corporate law encourages Non-U.S. companies to 
set up subsidiaries, which are separate corporate entities, to promote 
foreign direct investment.134 Additionally, international investors want to 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Brief of The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the 
National Foreign Trade Council, and the Federation of German Industries as Amici 
Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 13, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) 
(No. 11-965), 2012 WL 769612. 
 132. See Donald Earl Childress III, Supreme Court Observations: Bauman v. 
DaimlerChrysler, THE WLF LEGAL PULSE (Jan. 30, 2014), http://wlflegalpulse.com/ 
2014/01/30/supreme-court-observations-bauman-v-daimlerchrysler/ (“the Court’s 
decision will be welcomed by many corporate defendants seeking to resist expansive 
theories of general jurisdiction”); see, e.g., Michael R. Bloomberg & Charles E. 
Schumer, Sustaining New York’s and the US’ Global Financial Services Leadership, 
CITY OF NEW YORK, OFFICE OF THE MAYOR & UNITED STATES SENATE, 73 (noting that 
a major factor of the market’s competitiveness is the quality of the legal system, and as 
the jurisdictional reach expands and becomes more unpredictable, New York is viewed 
as a negative place to conduct business). 
 133. Subsidiaries are separate entities created to limit a parent corporation’s 
liability. See William A. Voxman, Comment, Jurisdiction Over A Parent Corporation 
In Its Subsidiary’s State of Incorporation, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 327-28 (1992) 
(stating that “[t]he imposition of such burdens [associated with having to litigate in a 
forum with which the parent may have virtually no contacts] on the nonresident parent 
corporation undermines the very purpose of creating the subsidiary—namely, limiting 
the parent’s liability”). The Court’s holding which respects corporate separateness will 
allow a corporation to avoid liability, eliminating its fear of being sued in a forum 
where it cannot satisfy the minimum requirements test. See Brief of Amici Curiae 
Viega GmbH & Co. KG and Viega International GmbH in Support of Petitioner 
DaimlerChrysler AG at 6-7, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-
965), 2013 WL 3421894. Accordingly, the company will be willing to do business in 
the United States. Cf. Brief of The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America, the National Foreign Trade Council, and the Federation of German Industries 
as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 131, at 13-14 (explaining that 
the Ninth Circuit’s agency test discourages foreign direct investment). 
 134. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Viega GmbH & Co. KG and Viega 
International GmbH in Support of Petitioner DaimlerChrysler AG, supra note 133, at 7-
8 (mentioning that when the German Viega Companies wanted “to diversify and take 
advantage of opportunities for new revenue and business growth outside of Germany,” 
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ensure that their “investment[s] will not be arbitrarily taken or 
diminished once it is made.”135 Thus, the more expansive and 
unpredictable the legal system is, the less likely companies will be 
willing to continue funding its business in that forum.136 
What would have happened if the court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision and deemed the agency test an acceptable method for 
attributing a subsidiary’s contacts to its parent corporation?137 Since one 
result of an expansive jurisdictional rule would be a substantial increase 
in the number of lawsuits in the United States concerning foreign 
conduct, companies would have reacted by taking precautionary 
measures and limiting their ties to the United States’ market or by 
completely eliminating the distribution of their goods in the United 
States.138 In addition, those Non-U.S. companies who choose to continue 
exposing their products to the United States’ market would probably 
change to an independent distribution network to avoid exposure to 
general jurisdiction in various forums.139 Moreover, these reactions 
would decrease foreign direct investment because companies would 
likely close their subsidiaries leading to a reduction of business taxes 
and increased unemployment.140 Furthermore, Non-U.S. manufacturers 
                                                                                                                 
it chose to create a subsidiary in the United States so that it could engage in the United 
States’ market, while avoiding direct liability and significant tax exposure). 
 135. Charles G. Schott, The U.S. Litigation Environment and Foreign Direct 
Investment: Supporting U.S. Competitiveness by Reducing Legal Costs and 
Uncertainty, DEP’T OF COMMERCE 3 (Oct. 2008) (noting that a legal system with 
predictable and enforceable rules should protect an investor’s investment). 
 136. See id. at 5. 
 137. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 775, 777-79 (9th Cir. 
2011) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
 138. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 28, at 26; Brief of 
Economiesuisse, the Swiss Bankers Ass’n, ICC Switzerland, Ass’n of German Banks, 
and the European Banking Federation as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 127, at 11. Expansive jurisdiction will likely result in a limited variety of available 
goods in the market, ultimately depriving Americans of the benefits of international 
trade. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 28, at 26. 
 139. See Brief of Economiesuisse, the Swiss Bankers Ass’n, ICC Switzerland, Ass’n 
of German Banks, and the European Banking Federation as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 127, at 11. 
 140. See Brief of Economiesuisse, the Swiss Bankers Ass’n, ICC Switzerland, Ass’n 
of German Banks, and the European Banking Federation as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 127, at 12; see also Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States of America, the National Foreign Trade Council, the Federation of 
German Industries, the Ass’n of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce, and the 
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would be unwilling to “certify their products as complying with 
standards and procedures in use in the United States.”141 This could 
prevent countries from implementing standards and procedures similar 
to those in the United States, which would create exportation barriers for 
United States’ products.142 Similarly, a decrease in exports may occur if 
American companies are hesitant to conduct business in other nations in 
fear of retaliatory rulings by their courts.143 Ultimately, any reduction in 
international trade will hurt the Nation’s long-term economic health.144 
Likewise, the potential threat of more lawsuits in the United States will 
harm the Nation’s economic health since the threat will discourage Non-
U.S. corporations from investing in the United States.145 Therefore, in 
light of the Nation’s economic health, the Court correctly declined to 
follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision. 
                                                                                                                 
Organization for International Investment as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner 
at 13, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965), 2013 WL 3421897 
(noting that “[f]oreign direct investment plays a vital role in the health of the United 
States Economy” because it creates jobs, provides for economic growth, enhances 
productivity, and supports nearby communities). 
 141. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 33, 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (No. 10-76), 
2010 WL 4735597 (recognizing that conforming products to United States’ standards 
and procedures may subject the manufacturer to general jurisdiction). 
 142. See id. 
 143. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 28, at 25; see also Bauman v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2011) (acknowledging that 
“countries have enacted retaliatory jurisdictional laws”); Amici Curiae Brief in Support 
of Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 129, at 15 (noting that 
companies are dissuaded from exporting goods when they can be faced with an 
expansive jurisdictional rule). 
 144. Cf. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31932, TRADE 
AGREEMENTS: IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY, 10 (2007) (“Economists generally agree 
that consumption gains for consumers comprise the largest long-term gains for an 
economy that arise from international trade . . . . A change in trade policies should lead 
to changes in prices for traded goods and, therefore, in consumers’ real incomes, as well 
as to changes in the efficiency of production, which will also improve a nation’s overall 
economic welfare.”). 
 145. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 28, at 25; Matthew Davis, 
Effects of Multinational Company Investments, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org/digest/may03/w9293.html (concluding that “foreign 
investment significantly boosts exports and economic growth in the host country”). 
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E. THE DAIMLER AG HOLDING SHOULD AID THE COUNTRY’S 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
An expansive jurisdictional test violates international comity by 
allowing any forum in the United States to resolve any dispute arising 
anywhere in the world.146 Likewise, an expansive test discounts other 
nations’ legal systems by ignoring the fact that they can adequately 
resolve disputes that occur within their country.147 This raises tensions 
between the United States and other nations.148 The Court’s holding in 
Daimler AG should minimize this tension by decreasing the number of 
lawsuits based on conduct occurring outside the United States, which 
will prohibit American courts from deciding lawsuits in lieu of other 
jurisdictions and force American courts to accept foreign judgments.149 
Furthermore, the Court’s holding should curtail the tension since it 
aligns with the European belief that “jurisdiction by imputation is 
discouraged.”150 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014); Brief of the Alliance 
of Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. and the Ass’n of Global Automakers as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 30-31, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) 
(No. 11-965), 2013 WL 3728810. 
 147. See Brief of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. & the Ass’n of 
Global Automakers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 146, at 30-31 
(arguing that United States’ courts should not be permitted to exercise universal 
jurisdiction over any dispute anywhere because it violates principles of international 
comity and disregards other nation’s sovereign rights). 
 148. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the 
National Foreign Trade Council, the Federation of German Industries, the Ass’n of 
German Chambers of Industry and Commerce, and the Organization for International 
Investment as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 140, at 20-21. 
 149. See United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (“Great 
care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal 
jurisdiction into the international field . . . .”); Brief of Economiesuisse, the Swiss 
Bankers Ass’n, ICC Switzerland, Ass’n of German Banks, and the European Banking 
Federation as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 127, at 9 
(acknowledging that tensions rise when foreign judgments are not recognized). 
 150. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2011); see also 
Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the National 
Foreign Trade Council, the Federation of German Industries, the Ass’n of German 
Chambers of Industry and Commerce, and the Organization for International 
Investment as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 140, at 22 
(recognizing that “[a]nchoring the United States law of general jurisdiction in similar 
reference points facilitates efforts to help the world’s legal systems work together, in 
harmony, rather than at cross purposes”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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Moreover, an expansive jurisdictional test impedes the executive 
branch’s ability to conduct its international affairs duties.151 In the past, 
the law of general jurisdiction has hindered negotiations with other 
nations concerning the enforcement of international judgments.152 The 
Court’s clarification on general jurisdiction should help diplomats 
achieve some degree of consensus.153 If it assists the country in 
obtaining foreign policy agreements, then Americans will be provided 
with “a fair, sufficiently predictable, and stable system for the resolution 
of disputes that cross national boundaries.”154 
IV. THE HOLDING IN DAIMLER AG WAS THE RIGHT 
DECISION 
The Court’s holding is a step in the right direction not only for 
protecting businesses, but also for the country as a whole. The Court-
endorsed clear, uniform framework should decrease the likelihood that 
numerous forums will subject a corporation to liability where it did not 
anticipate liability.155 Since the increased predictability will allow a 
corporation “to manage their liabilities, predict risks, raise capital and 
enter into mutually beneficial business relationships,” a Non-U.S. 
corporation will not be deterred from selling its goods in the United 
                                                                                                                 
 151. See Bauman, 676 F.3d at 777-79. 
 152. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 161 (2001); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 127, at 2. 
 153. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the 
National Foreign Trade Council, the Federation of German Industries, the Ass’n of 
German Chambers of Industry and Commerce, and the Organization for International 
Investment as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 140, at 21 (noting 
that “[t]he United States . . . is not a party to any bilateral or multilateral convention 
governing jurisdiction or judgment enforcement,” and that diplomats have been 
unsuccessful because of the differences between American principles of jurisdiction 
and other country’s doctrines). 
 154. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra   
note 127, at 2-3. 
 155. See Howard Wasserman, Quick Thoughts on Personal Jurisdiction, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 16, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/ 
2014/01/download-daimler.html; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 28, at 27 
(explaining that the Court’s framework will provide defendants “with some minimum 
assurance as to where [their] conduct will and will not render them liable to suit”); cf. 
supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text. 
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States’ market.156 In addition, the Court’s holding respects the corporate 
form (i.e. the parent-subsidiary relationship) by recognizing corporate 
separateness and applying it consistently to all aspects of a company’s 
operations.157 Moreover, the Court’s holding respects fair play and 
substantial justice, which will likely aid in foreign policy negotiations 
and maintain foreign direct investment.158 
However, the Court failed to specify how the “at home” standard 
should be applied, which could lead to potential future problems. “The . 
. . Court did not resolve . . . when and how the contacts of a subsidiary 
can form the basis for gaining jurisdiction over a parent.”159 Although 
the Court clearly discounts the agency test, it does not specify how to 
apply the appropriate standard to similar situations.160 The Court 
mentions two paradigm places where a corporation is “at home,” but it 
also states that these are not the only forums that can exercise general 
personal jurisdiction.161 Because of this, it would have been more 
effective for the Court to state explicitly that a court can only exercise 
jurisdiction over a Non-U.S. parent company in a forum that does not 
contain its principal place of business or its place of incorporation when 
the parent and subsidiary are essentially alter egos.162 Moreover, the 
Court should have provided an example of how to properly apply the “at 
home” standard to determine jurisdiction in a forum where a company 
does not meet either of the paradigm places.163 By further clarifying 
what additional forums can adequately exercise general jurisdiction, the 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Brief of The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the 
National Foreign Trade Council, and the Federation of German Industries as Amici 
Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 131, at 8-9. 
 157. Mr. Dupree argued that corporate separateness should be applied to all aspects 
of a business’s operations since it is already applied to a company’s taxes. See 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-11, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) 
(No. 11-965), 2013 WL 5629592. Likewise, Mr. Kneedler argued that corporate 
separateness is the general rule in American corporate law. Id. at 24. 
 158. See discussion supra Parts III.D, III.E. 
 159. Wasserman, supra note 155. 
 160. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 161. See supra notes 15, 87-88 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 163. See Donald Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction After Bauman, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. EN BANC 197, 202 (questioning how district courts will interpret the term 
“exceptional circumstances”). 
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Court would have enhanced predictability to a greater degree.164 
Nevertheless, the logical application of the Court’s standard is to permit 
only a few forums that do not constitute the paradigm places to exercise 
jurisdiction over a parent corporation, and not to allow every forum in 
which a subsidiary is present to hold a parent company liable.165 
CONCLUSION 
The above analysis reveals that a plaintiff can only attribute a 
subsidiary’s contacts to its parent corporation in limited circumstances. 
Such a result is clearly justified and efficient because it creates one 
standard for courts to apply when imputing a subsidiary’s in-state 
contacts to its parent company. This will decrease the number of 
American lawsuits against Non-U.S. parent corporations for actions of 
its subsidiaries and will curtail a plaintiff’s ability to forum shop. In 
addition, it will increase a Non-U.S. parent corporation’s ability to 
predict and foresee where it could be held liable, facilitating a Non-U.S. 
corporation’s willingness to do business in the United States and 
increasing foreign direct investment. Moreover, this ruling will alleviate 
some of the legal tensions between the United States and other countries 
since the Court’s standard narrows an American court’s jurisdictional 
reach. 
Although every decision is bound to have some complications, the 
Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman provides guidance for lower 
courts by establishing the appropriate test for satisfying the first step of 
the general jurisdiction inquiry. This decision was imperative since 
personal jurisdiction is an essential element of every lawsuit and there 
was a split among the circuit courts. By aligning the test with well-
established corporate law principles, the Court is protecting corporations 
at the expense of a plaintiff’s potential inability to plead personal 
jurisdiction successfully. Nevertheless, this result will “restore the 
predictability that the due process clause is designed to afford potential 
defendants.”166 The Court’s holding enhances fairness, predictability, 
and foreseeability, directs courts to respect a defendant’s due process 
rights, and leads to economic and political benefits for the Nation as a 
                                                                                                                 
 164. See id. (noting that the meaning of “exceptional circumstances” is uncertain, 
and could lead to “creative lawyering and continued uses of general jurisdiction beyond 
what the Court appears to intend”). 
 165. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 166. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 28, at 19. 
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whole. Thus, the needs of the Nation supersede the trivial unfairness that 
the holding may create. 
 
